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Abstract—Distributed Reflective Denial of Service (DRDoS)
attacks are an immanent threat to Internet services. The potential
scale of such attacks became apparent in March 2018 when
a memcached-based attack peaked at 1.7 Tbps. Novel services
built upon UDP increase the need for automated mitigation
mechanisms that react to attacks without prior knowledge of
the actual application protocols used. With the flexibility that
software-defined networks offer, we developed a new approach
for defending against DRDoS attacks; it not only protects against
arbitrary DRDoS attacks but is also transparent for the attack
target and can be used without assistance of the target host
operator. The approach provides a robust mitigation system
which is protocol-agnostic and effective in the defense against
DRDoS attacks.
Index Terms—DDoS mitigation; reflective DDoS attacks;
network-based mitigation; software-defined networking
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are one of the
key threats to network security. A new record for the extent
of such an attack was set in March 2018 when an attack
exceeded 1.7 Tbps of traffic [7]. This “memcached attack”
is a Distributed Reflective Denial of Service (DRDoS) that
does not attack the target directly but instead send request
packets to an exploitable third party service (i. e., the reflector)
with a spoofed sender IP address. The responses of the
third party server are then sent to the actual attack target
and cause overloading. Protocols with response messages that
are significantly larger than request messages are particularly
well suited for these attacks due to amplification effects. The
nature of these attacks requires services that work without an
established connection between client and server. In a recent
analysis [4] in 2017, Jonker et al. found that 99.27% of all
DRDoS attacks are using the protocols NTP, DNS, CharGen,
SSDP, and RIPv1; all of these are based on UDP and possess
a registered or well-known port number just like the newer
memcached attack. Messages received in a DRDoS attack are
hard to differentiate from benign traffic, as they conform to
the protocol specification. The reflectors are correctly handling
requests they deem to be legitimate. However, the lack of
a request for the responses is a characteristic of reflective
attacks that cannot be masked. Due to the stateless design
of UDP, additional mechanisms on the application layer are
often used to attribute a response to a corresponding request.
Tracking such request/response mappings within a network is
infeasible for several reasons including scalability issues and
the necessity to probe application layer messages.
To this end, we introduce a lightweight NAT-based packet
filtering approach that reliably mitigates most common re-
flective attacks without disrupting regular connections. This
approach does not require participation of the target host
administrator and can therefore be offered by ISPs as-a-service
to any of their customers. Software-defined networking (SDN)
provides the flexibility to build and deploy such a system
without interfering with the existing network infrastructure
since the system can be added to the SDN controller.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II outlines previous mechanisms for DRDoS mitigation.
In Section III, we introduce the architecture of our detection
and mitigation system. Section IV explores the implementation
details. Section V concludes the paper and outlines our plans
for future development.
II. RELATED WORK
The inherent characteristics of DRDoS attacks lead to
unique challenges for their mitigation. To provide an effective
defense for a potential target of such attacks, the mitigation
mechanism must be deployed in the network of the target
host. We discuss previous defense approaches against DDoS
and DRDoS attacks, which proposed solutions to the specific
challenges of this kind of attack.
A review of related work showed that defense against DR-
DoS attacks can be divided into multiple tasks: (1a) monitoring
and data collection of network traffic, (1b) interpretation of this
data and detection of an ongoing attack, and (2) prevention or
mitigation of the attack. Depending on their primary tasks,
existing solutions vary widely in their assumptions and re-
quirements. As we take into account high bandwidth networks,
we also assess the level of scalability of existing solutions on
the task level. Especially the data collection has high impact
on scalability, since each packet in the network traffic must
be regarded and processed in a timely manner. This task runs
continuously for all traffic during the attack-free operation of
the network. Therefore, the interpretation and attack detection
task becomes critical for the latency within the network.
Passive monitoring does not suffer from this limitation as
traffic is not affected during detection. The final task for an
ongoing attack once detected is mitigating the impact of the
attack without interfering with legitimate traffic.
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For example PacketScore, by Kim et al. [5], and its ex-
tension ALPi, proposed by Ayres et al. [2]. Both use packet
statistics to compare each packet to benign and attack traffic
and rate each packet. Packets that are similar to attack traffic
get discarded. The approach requires active network monitor-
ing and, therefore, the data collection impacts the latency of
all traffic. The resource requirements are considerably higher
for PacketScore than for other related work, in particular for
high bandwidth networks. One of ALPi’s latency-optimized
detection mechanisms, the lightweight leaky bucket, yields
2.82 % false negatives at a false positive ratio of less than
0.1 %. The approach was designed to defend against general
network attacks and should be applicable to DRDoS attacks
with a modified set of packet attributes.
The approach of Wei et al. [12] uses traffic statistics.
It correlates the packet rates for all flow pairs passing the
same router. Legitimate traffic is assumed not to exhibit any
such correlation, while flows belonging to an attack linearly
correlate in their packet rate. However, the calculation of
pairwise correlation coefficients for each pair of flow makes
the detection very costly. According to Wei et al., the quality of
the DRDoS detection has a false negative ratio of 0.18,% and
a false positive ratio of 0.10 %. Gao et al. [3] conducted their
own evaluation of Wei et al. [12], which showed a detection
rate of 96 % but a false positive ratio as high as 30 %.
In our earlier work [8], we employ traffic statistics to detect
attacks and then mitigate them using SDN. This method probes
the service of the target host to estimate its load. If the
service becomes unavailable, the client hosts that produce
most of the target’s load are scored as suspicious and their
traffic is redirected. Since passive monitoring is employed, no
latency is introduced by the data collection. The detection
via scoring is very lightweight; therefore it scales well to
high-speed networks. However, a basic analysis of the whole
traffic data is still needed. Redirecting suspicious traffic to a
CAPTCHA server prevents to cut-off false positives from the
service. Depending on the scenario, we determined between
5 % and 18 % false positives in the identification of attackers.
The approach originally was not designed for reflective but
direct distributed-denial-of-service attacks, but can be applied
to both with only minimal changes.
Other approaches exist that have stronger assumptions about
the network environment than the presented approaches and
our work. For example, L-RAD [6] proposes an active message
authentication by the deep integration of the target host into
the detection mechanism. To incorporate multiple defenses in
a flexible and scalable way, Mahimkar et al. [10] propose the
architecture dFence to deploy arbitrary detection and mitiga-
tion approaches. The goals of these works are distinctively
different from our proposal, therefore we do not discuss them
further.
A common mitigation mechanism for reflective DDoS at-
tacks is to completely block the port of the service that gets
abused. This successfully mitigates the attack; however, any
legitimate traffic using the same port (e. g., legitimate DNS
requests during a DNS-based reflective attack) is also affected.
The mitigation of attacks in all these models depends on the
analysis of all packets going through the network node where
the mitigation is located, which is very costly. Therefore,
we developed a mitigation mechanism that does not need to
analyze any attack packets during mitigation except for the
usual layer-3 forwarding rules.
III. ARCHITECTURE
The building blocks of our mitigation architecture are illus-
trated in Figure 1 and referenced throughout the text in the
encircled numbers 1 to 4 . The mitigation is based on NAT
packet filtering, which is implemented in SDN. If a detection
system reports a DRDoS attack, our mitigation is activated
automatically.
1 In general, there are four types of messages receivable by
the target host: legitimate requests and responses and illegiti-
mate (malicious) requests and responses. During a DRDoS at-
tack, illegitimate responses must be filtered while during other
DDoS attacks malicious requests must be filtered. Therefore, a
separation of requests and responses is the first step to mitigate
a reflective attack. DRDoS attacks are typically performed
using UDP, therefore only UDP packets are analyzed by the
DRDoS mitigation system. As a result, all UDP responses are
forwarded to the DRDoS mitigation system, while all UDP
requests and TCP packets are forwarded to the destination or
alternatively to a DDoS mitigation system.
2 The DRDoS mitigation system needs to classify incom-
ing responses either as legitimate or illegitimate. The basic
assumption used to differentiate legitimate responses from
illegitimate responses is that a response can only be legitimate
if the target host sent a corresponding request beforehand.
A very simple solution to determine whether a correspond-
ing request has been sent is the use of Network Address
Translation (NAT) [11], [1]. We use an adapted form of
NAT. During an attack, the NAT is activated and the source
IP address of the attack target (Fig. 1: target IP address)
is replaced by an alias IP address in outgoing UDP-based
requests. Therefore, all responses created upon these requests
are sent to the alias IP address. The destination IP address
of incoming responses destined to the alias IP address is
replaced by the corresponding target IP address and forwarded
to the target host. This mechanism can be used to effectively
distinguish legitimate responses from illegitimate ones without
observing the attack traffic. Only the benign UDP requests
from the attack target have to be tracked by the NAT. Legiti-
mate responses contain the alias IP address as their destination
IP address, while illegitimate responses contain the target
IP address as their destination IP address. TCP packets and
incoming UDP requests are forwarded to the target as usual.
The NAT-based solution scales very well for very high attack
packet rates as the attack traffic does not have to be observed.
3 A second differentiator separates requests from responses
to be able to use NAT only for outgoing requests, but not for
outgoing responses. Using this concept, the target host does
not have to be aware of the DRDoS mitigation mechanism.
All required tasks to mitigate the attack are implemented by
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Fig. 1: Sketch of the mitigation mechanism.
the network address translator and the differentiator. 4 The
DRDoS mitigation is a simple forwarding unit that discards all
UDP packets addressed to the target IP address. It is imperative
that the alias IP address is not easily guessable, so it is not
easily possible for attackers to switch their attack to the alias
IP address. Since the alias IP address is only visible to UDP-
based services utilized by the target host, (and these services
cannot know that this request comes from the target as the
alias IP address should not be known) the alias IP address can
only be discovered by the attacker if the attacker can observe
the network traffic at the target. For additional security, if
an attacker might still be able to guess the alias IP address,
the address could also be changed regularly (with a grace
period where both IP addresses are accepted to allow for open
connections to finish) and thereby implementing a moving
target defense.
The effectiveness of this approach depends on the dis-
tinctiveness of responses and requests. One possibility to
differentiate responses from requests would be to analyze the
payload, possibly containing a response flag, or similar static
substrings. Using payload analysis does not scale well and
requires protocol-specific knowledge. However, most services
that are used for reflective attacks have a default port (e. g.,
53 for DNS) that can be used instead [4]. Our detection
mechanism is able to extract and identify the application
protocol port from the UDP header and to forward it to the mit-
igation system. This approach is application protocol-agnostic
and supports any UDP-based request/response protocol that
follows a client/server design.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The design goal of our system is the ease of deployment
in a given software-defined network with low overhead and
without changing the network topology. We base our system
on our prior work introduced in 2017 [8] and extended in
2018 [9]. Two components are required to implement this
TABLE I: Flow entries of the combined solution of the
differentiator-based approach. IP t: IP address of the target
host. IPa: alias IP address used by the NAT component. pa:
default port of the attack.
Match Fields
ActionEtherType IPv4 UDPSRC DST SRC DST
0x0800 (IPv4) IPt ∗ ∗ pa ⇒ CONTROLLER
0x0800 IPt ∗ pa ∗ ⇒ TARGET
0x0800 ∗ IPt ∗ pa ⇒ TARGET
0x0800 ∗ IPt pa ∗ DROP
0x0800 ∗ IPa pa ∗ ⇒ CONTROLLER
0x0806 (ARP) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ⇒ CONTROLLER
system: for one, a monitoring system that can handle the traffic
load and that meets our feature requirements, and second, an
SDN controller that works with our hardware, allows for rapid
prototyping, and works well with our network monitor. Based
on these requirements, we chose the Bro Network Monitor1
to detect attacks based on prior research and Ryu2 as SDN
controller. Moreover, these tools are already interoperable
by the well-established Bro Client Communications Library
“Broccoli”.
The Ryu application of the prototype provides the imple-
mentation of the mitigation mechanism. Bro informs Ryu of
an attack supplemented by the target host’s IP address and
the default port pa of the attack. Blocking or redirecting
traffic of single clients is realized by specifying a flow entry
for every reported IP address of targets under attack. We
implemented the NAT component in two different ways. One
solution utilizes the SDN switch to forward packets based on
their header fields and then employs the Ryu controller to
actively modify packets before they are forwarded. The SDN
rules for this implementation can be found in Table I. This
1https://bro.org
2https://github.com/osrg/ryu
TABLE II: Flow entries of the SDN switch-only implementation of the differentiator-based approach. IP t: IP address of the
target host. b(IPv): Broadcast address of the target host’s subnetwork. IPa: alias IP address used by the NAT component.
MAC v: MAC address of the target host. pa: default port of the attack.
Match Fields
ActionEtherType ARP IPv4 UDPOP TPA SRC DST SRC DST
0x0800 (IPv4) ∗ ∗ IPt ∗ ∗ pa set-field IPV4 SRC = IPa⇒ TARGET
0x0800 ∗ ∗ IPt ∗ pa ∗ ⇒ TARGET
0x0800 ∗ ∗ ∗ IPt ∗ pa ⇒ TARGET
0x0800 ∗ ∗ ∗ IPt pa ∗ DROP
0x0800 ∗ ∗ ∗ IPa pa ∗ set-field IPV4 DST = IPt⇒ TARGET
0x0806 (ARP) 1 IPa ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
set-field ETH SRC = MAC v
set-field ETH DST = ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
set-field ARP OP = 2
set-field ARP SPA = IPa
set-field ARP SHA = MAC v
set-field ARP TPA = b(IPv)
set-field ARP THA = ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
⇒ TARGET
implementation relies on mandatory OpenFlow 1.3 features
and, therefore, works with any switch that implements Open-
Flow 1.3 correctly. Our second implementation makes use of
optional OpenFlow 1.3 features. The utilized rules are shown
in Table II. This variant works without the involvement of the
SDN controller in modifying packets and is therefore faster
and more scalable. However, not all switches implementing
OpenFlow 1.3 have the capability to run this implementation.
Our hardware features an HPE FlexFabric 5920 switch
which supports OpenFlow 1.3. The web server (attack target)
and the monitoring system (Ryu and Bro) run on separate
systems each with the following specifications: CPU with
4x3.10Ghz3 and 17GiB of memory. The attacks are run from
three replay servers with a 6x2.40 GHz CPU4 and 125GiB of
memory each. With this hardware, a throughput of 6.5 Gbps
could be achieved and attacks at that rate were successfully
mitigated.
V. CONCLUSION
DRDoS attacks cause vast economic damage. It is imper-
ative to detect and mitigate these attacks early before the
attack target is impaired. We designed and implemented a new
mitigation mechanism that can reliably detect and mitigate
arbitrary DRDoS attacks as long as the underlying protocol
uses UDP and a fixed server port. The mitigation system
described in this paper makes use of basic SDN features and
can be implemented in any network with switches that are
OpenFlow 1.3 capable. The mitigation is entirely network-
based (i. e., independent of the attack target) and is fully
transparent to the target. The architecture description in this
paper should allow for the implementation of this defense
system in any SDN-based network.
In this paper, we only focused on the defense side of reflec-
tive attacks. For future work, we will work on improvements
to the detection mechanims.
3Intel Xeon Processor E3-1220 v3
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